Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me this

time, and I do rise as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence and the Committee on International Relations, and I want

to commend the authors of the resolution. I think it is straightforward

and an accurate statement of the facts regarding Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, I want to address just a few aspects of the resolution,

particularly those relating to the WMD. As H. Res. 557 notes, the

brutal regime of Saddam Hussein not only trampled on the rights of the

Iraqi people but he repeatedly defied the U.N. Security Council and

ignored its obligations to the U.N. weapons inspectors. The resolution

correctly notes that in November 2002, the Security Council unanimously

agreed that Iraq ``remains in material breach of its obligations under

the relevant resolutions.''

Let me repeat that, because it is important. The U.N. Security

Council unanimously found that Iraq was unquestionably in material

breach of its international obligations. The Iraqi regime had

unquestionably interfered

with the IAEA inspectors and prevented the U.N. from effectively doing

its job.

Contrary to our greatest fear, and fortunately for our forces, Iraq

did not use weapons of mass destruction in the conflict with the U.S.

and allied forces. Members of this body are acutely aware of the fact

that no large WMD stockpiles have been found. This, of course, raises a

number of questions. We certainly should examine the quality of our

intelligence, and the appropriate oversight committees are doing just

that. It is important, however, to remind the body of exactly what we

have found that Saddam Hussein did possess.

We know, for example, that Saddam had, A, a concealed ballistic

missile production line that dramatically breached U.N. range and

payload restrictions; B, had covert programs to develop both new and

more effective liquid and solid rocket fuels, which would further

enhance the range and accuracy of Saddam's illegal missiles; C, had a

secret pipeline to purchase advanced missile components and technology

from North Korea; and had, D, two separate undeclared, unmanned aerial

vehicle production lines that senior Iraqi officials now admit were to

have been used for carrying biological weapons.

These items are critically important because missiles and UAVs are

the means to deliver any weapons of mass destruction. That is why the

U.N. prohibited Iraq from having these systems. There is no doubt that

these missiles and UAV programs existed, in clear violation of Iraq's

international obligations; and there is no doubt that they had WMD

application.

What else do we know that Saddam Hussein had? One, the Iraqi Survey

Group has found a network of labs and safe houses that contained

everything needed for chemical/biological weapons production. These

were undeclared facilities under the direct control of the Iraqi

intelligence and security services.

Two, at an Iraqi prison they found evidence of an undeclared

chemical/biological laboratory complex that seems to have been for

human testing.

Three, we have learned that Iraq maintained a WMD scientific

community and infrastructure that was organized in such a way that WMD

production could be quickly resumed.

Four, we learned from David Kay, the former head of the Iraqi Survey

Group, that Saddam and his son Uday were demanding to know from their

subordinates how long it would take Iraq to produce chemical weapons.

And, five, while the evidence on nuclear activity is less clear,

David Kay has testified that ``the testimony we have obtained from

Iraqi scientists should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still

wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.'' He did.

Mr. Speaker, none of this should be in the least bit surprising.

Throughout the 1990s, we knew Saddam Hussein was seeking to maintain an

arsenal of prohibited weapons. Over the years, he became a master of

deception, hiding many elements of his extensive WMD program. For

example, after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, we found that Iraq was much

further along on a nuclear weapons development program than anyone had

suspected, only months from a serious capability.

We do know in the 1990s Saddam himself admitted he possessed 30,000

liters of anthrax. Now, remember, just a teaspoon of anthrax paralyzed

the other body, the Senate, for months.

Saddam acknowledged a stockpile of 5,000 gallons of botulinum toxin

and 25 biologically filled Scud missiles. He admitted to these lethal

weapons after years of denying he had such weapons because his son-in-

law defected and provided incontrovertible evidence of their existence.

All intelligence services--U.S., British, French, Italian, German,

and others, agreed that Iraq had WMD. The U.N. concluded Iraq possessed

a hidden WMD arsenal. The IAEA warned that Saddam was not cooperating.

The WMD threat in the late 1990s was considered so compelling that, in

December 1998, President Clinton felt he had no choice but to launch

retaliatory airstrikes. The case for action was compelling in 1998, and

the case was every bit as compelling in 2003.

Certainly our intelligence could have been better; it should have

been better. It will never be as good as the consumers--the

policymakers--want it to be.

As we prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were gaps in our

knowledge. There were things that we just did not know. It would seem

that we just didn't have good access to Saddam Hussein's inner circle.

There is a reason we didn't have that access and the intelligence

information we would have wanted. Frankly, in the decade following the

collapse of the former Soviet Union, we didn't invest adequately in

human intelligence (HUMINT). The Intelligence Community sharply reduced

the number of case officers, and the number of recruited intelligence

assets is reported to have significantly declined.

This lack of HUMINT resources was compounded by self-imposed limits

on whom our intelligence officers could recruit. In the 1990s the CIA

established guidelines that made it extremely difficult to recruit the

unsavory characters--individuals who are exactly the sort who could

have provided useful intelligence. Any excuses aside, the ``Deutsch

Guidelines'', as they were known, discouraged the recruitment of spies

with criminal or human rights issues in their background. Yet these

were precisely the sort of people who could get close to Saddam

Hussein. In practical effect, our intelligence services were not

allowed to recruit them.

With the active and tenacious involvement of the Intelligence

Committee the Deutsch Guidelines were rescinded in the FY 2002

Intelligence Authorization Act, but there is little doubt that the

damage to our human collection capability has been substantial. Under

the guidance of the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the Chairman

of the HPSCI, this body has been supporting the rebuilding of our

HUMINT capability so that we aren't as likely to face future

intelligence gaps. It is, however, a matter that will require continued

priority, resources, and the close attention from the relevant

oversight committees.

Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 557 is a good resolution that reflects the basic

truth that the world is much better without Saddam Hussein governing

Iraq. This Member commends the authors of the resolution and urges its

support.